On whether individuals should keep their promises
On whether individuals should keep their promises
In spite of this striving (as seen in the previous paragraph, to the greatest extent humanly possible) not to be a moral philosophy, some replies to moral questions need to be provided here too, if for no other reason than illustration. After all, any theory is also assessed on the responses it gives to basic human questions, particularly if these have already been prominently asked. (Although, one has to admit, these questions are themselves the practical result of the implementation of older philosophies, placing any new philosophy at the disadvantage of having to heed, and tend to, the problems of the past—and therefore treating the question (on the relevance of the philosophy concerned) as the answer.) One such prominent question is, why should individuals keep their promises? In an informational approach, one would first have to analyse what a promise is: it is a (conditional) processing initiated on the information platform that is the state by an individual assisted by its state (warranting the individual’s identity—and also the identity of the other party, for the same purposes). Keeping the promise, therefore, would be the final part, the conclusion of the algorithm underlying the processing—nothing more or less. A promise should (presumably) be kept because it exists, because the corresponding processing has been initiated on the information platform and it strives for its completion. Whether an individual should be forced to keep a promise (something entirely possible on the information platform that is the state), as for example in the case of a contract, is an entirely different (political) matter.
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